A simple example of a stochastic game with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of discount factors, including those close to one, equilibrium is unique.
Introduction
A simple example of a stochastic game with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of discount factors, including those close to one, equilibrium is unique.
Moreover, the equilibrium for large discount factors is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium for low discount factors. A unique cyclic equilibrium is also possible for intermediate ranges of discount factors.
Consider first an infinitely repeated stage-game, such as the prisoners' dilemma, with discounting and public randomization. A great deal is known about the structure of sub-game perfect equilibrium payoffs as a function of the discount factor. For zero discount factor, the equilibrium payoffs are the convex hull of static Nash payoffs, which will be a singleton if, as in the prisoners' dilemma, the static equilibrium is unique. As the discount factor increases, the set of equilibrium payoffs are non-decreasing convex sets, typically increasing in sudden jumps. If certain technical conditions are satisfied 1 , as the discount factor approaches one, the folk theorem holds: the set of equilibrium payoffs approaches the entire individually rational socially feasible set. Even if we allow for imperfect public information, the work of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1988] and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994] show that this basic picture is unchanged for perfect public equilibrium.
An important generalization of repeated games are stochastic games. Here there is a finite collection of different states. In each state a particular stage-game is played, and that play determines not only stage-payoffs, but also determines Markov transition probabilities over which state occurs next. For an important class of these games, including those in which regardless of play every state has a positive probability of being reached in finite time, Dutta [1991] shows that the folk theorem continues to hold. Binmore, Shaked and Sutton [1985] . To see that this is the case in the war-of-attrition, notice that a delay followed by a public randomization over one player winning, such that each player gets (including the delay) in expected value more than their minmax level, is in fact subgame perfect. These results, though similar to the purely repeated case, are not as robust. In the bargaining model the folk theorem is not robust to a continuum of actions, since in that case Rubinstein [1982] showed that there is a unique equilibrium. In the war-of-attrition, the folk theorem fails without public randomization. In neither case has the issue of monotonicity with public randomization been studied.
Another class of stochastic games to which Dutta's theorem does not apply are games in which there are no absorbing states, but in which movement between different states is possible only with some degree of agreement among the players. The goal of this paper is to study a simple example of such a game, and show that these games can be radically different than repeated games. The type of game we study is one in which positional advantage is important, and expensive to defend. The specific example is a two-player two-state game, which is symmetric in the sense that the role of the two players is reversed in the two states. In each state, one player is a Lord and receives a high utility and the other a Serf who receives a lower utility. Each player has two actions:
the Lord may defend his castle, which is costly, or not. If the castle is left undefended, the Serf may attack the castle, which is also costly, but results in his becoming Lord in the following period. Notice that regardless of the state, the other state is reachable, but only if the players agree, in the sense that the Lord fails to defend, and the Serf attacks. This may be thought of as a useful paradigm for situations in which position has an advantage, for example, the Lord might be a monopolist, and the Serf an innovator. Here the monopolist must decide whether to engage in costly patenting activity that will preempt the entrant, and prevent him from introducing an innovation that will result in the entrant assuming the monopoly position. This example has a number of features that differentiate it from a simple repeated game:
• For a range of discount factors including all discount factors near one (and all discount factors near zero) the equilibrium is unique.
• The equilibrium for discount factors near one is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with discount factors near zero. Basically, for low discount factors, the Lord will not bother to defend, nor the Serf to attack. However, for high discount factors, the Serf will wish to attack and this forces the Lord to defend. The result is that resources are wasted on defense.
• For intermediate ranges of discount factors and when it is much more costly to defend than to attack, there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is cyclic -the two players alternate between being Lord and Serf. It is also inefficient.
We also consider how robust these results are to introducing a small exogenous probability that the roles are reversed regardless of play in the stage game. Here Dutta's conditions apply, so the folk theorem must hold for discount factors sufficiently close to one. However, if the exogenous probability of reversal is small enough, then there will still be a range of large discount factors for which there is still a unique equilibrium in which the Lord defends and the Serf attacks. For discount factors near zero, the unique equilibrium is still neither defense nor attack. This implies that monotonicity fails: the set of equilibria for the large discount factors is not a superset of that for small discount factors. Moreover, if the exogenous probability of reversal is small enough relative to the subjective interest rate, the irreversible model much more accurately captures the set of equilibria than does the folk theorem.
The Castle on the Hill
In In the infinitely repeated game, both players maximize average present value of utility, and are equally patient with common discount factor 0 1 ≤ < δ .
We will examine the case in which it is considerably better to be Lord than Serf.
In particular we assume that it is better to be a Lord and pay double the defense cost than it is to be a serf.
We will also be interested in whether or not d > 1; if so, we will say that it is more expensive to defend than to attack.
Analysis of the Game
If the discount factor is zero or equivalently the game is played only once, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the Serf will consume, and the Lord will consume.
In fact any Nash equilibrium results in the same utility, as it is strictly dominant for the Lord to consume, and weakly dominant for the Serf to consume. As we shall see the unique subgame perfect equilibrium extends to discount factors close to zero.
To put the game in the context of the folk theorem, it is useful to begin by describing the socially feasible individually rational set. Because the game is not repeated, the socially feasible payoff set depends on the discount factor. With public randomization, when the discount factor is zero, it is the triangular region shown in As the discount factor increases, the socially feasible payoff set (with public randomization) is monotone, and in the limit as the discount factor approaches one, it approaches the convex hull of the triangular set and its mirror image as shown in Figure   4 . By way of contrast, the minmax points depend on the state, but are independent of the discount factor. The minmax for Lord is x d − ; he can guarantee this amount by defending and can be held to this by the Serf attacking. The minmax for the Serf is 1; he can guarantee this amount by consuming and can be held to this amount by the Lord defending.
Our main theorem gives a partial characterization of equilibrium payoffs.
Theorem:
(A) If 0 1
there is a unique Nash equilibrium: the Lord and Serf both consume regardless of the history. ; if he defends now, he gets no
Suppose that this is the case, so that it is always optimal for the Lord to consume. If the Serf consumes, he gets 1. If he attacks, then he gets at most 0, , , x x K yielding a present value of δx , and he gets no less than 0, ,0, , x x K yielding a present value of δ δ x / ( ) 1 + . So it is certainly optimal for the Serf to consume if 1 > δx . Combining this condition, for the condition for the Lord to consume gives (A).
On the other hand, if δ δ x / ( ) 1 1 + > then certainly the Serf will attack. A necessary condition for a discount factor that satisfies this inequality together with the condition for the Lord consuming is
This is equivalent to 2 1 1
1 , which give (B).
To prove (C) recall that the minmax for Lord is 
Robustness to Noise
How robust are these results? The condition that every state be reached with positive probability from every other state is a generic one, so irreversibility of the type considered here is non-generic. Suppose we consider the generic case. In particular, let us introduce a small exogenous probability that the roles are reversed regardless of play in the stage game. Then Dutta's condition applies, so the folk theorem must hold for 
